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CONTRACT MINING AGREEMENTS -
THE CONTRACT MINER'S PERSPECTIVE
HENRY MC. INGRAM*
and
JOHN H. LAWRENCE, JR.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on legal issues which will arise in the contract min-
ing relationship and offers suggestions to the contract miner and his advisors
concerning areas of additional inquiry before the mining agreement is exe-
cuted.' Obviously, the parties will be interested in assigning the risks, shift-
ing the burdens and determining the liabilities of the proposed operation.
Various business considerations favor the use of a contract mining ar-
rangement, which may provide a viable alternative when the underlying
lease restricts assignment and subletting. It offers an opportunity to shift
certain burdens of the proposed operation to another party. It affords the
owner the opportunity to control reserves and coal sales without the burden
of operational responsibilities and capital investments.
As in any business transaction, the objectives of the contracting parties
and the relative strengths which they bring to the negotiations will deter-
mine the form and substance of a contract mining agreement. It is, of course,
one thing to suggest that the miner seek an indemnification provision in the
agreement for liabilities which he may incur-it is quite another to negotiate
successfully the inclusion of such a clause in the agreement. The contract
miner should also realize that if the owner 2 insists that the proposed mining
operation be conducted with union employees or that the miner secure and
maintain all necessary permits, the ultimate arrangement will undoubtedly
contain those elements. The miner, however, should be familiar with the
problems which may arise in such circumstances and should attempt to pro-
tect his interests to the maximum extent possible in negotiations for the
agreement.
Having made the decision to use the contract mining arrangement, the
parties may encounter difficulty in drafting the agreement because of their
* Henry Ingram received his B.A. degree from Allegheny College in 1961 and his LL.B. from
University of Michigan in 1964. John Lawrence received his B.S. degree from Washington and
Lee University in 1978 and his J.D. from the University of Virginia in 1975. Messrs. Ingram and
Lawrence are partners in the law firm of Rose, Schmidt, Dixon & Hasley, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the substantial research and related efforts of David
Onuscheck and Bruce A. Bartolotta in the preparation of this Article.
' This Article is written as a companion to the accompanying article, Gage, Drafting a Con-
tract Mining Agreement- The Owner's Perspective, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 821 (1984), which describes
the contract mining relationship from the owner's perspective.
2 Throughout the Article we refer to the person having the right to mine the coal as the
"owner" even though he may not actually own the coal in fee but may be a lessee or perhaps
another contract miner.
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desire to assign various risks, liabilities and costs in a way that may be incon-
sistent with an independent contractor relationship. Care must be taken to
avoid converting the independent contractor relationship into some other
relationship.
The primary purposes of this Article are to survey the applicable law,
suggest how an assessment of the risks, burdens and liabilities can be made
from the contract miner's perspective, and suggest specific clauses for the
contract mining agreement. Specific consideration has been given to the laws
of Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia.
II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
One of the first considerations in establishing the structure of the mining
relationship is the nature of the owner's interest in the coal. Where the
owner is a lessee under a lease which prohibits assignment or subleasing, the
lessee must obtain the consent of the lessor to assign the lease or enter into a
sublease. However, the lessee may be unwilling to ask for a consent to an
assignment or sublease since such a request is often met with a counter re-
quest by the lessor to increase the lease royalty or make other concessions.
Under these circumstances, a properly structured contract mining agreement
should avoid a violation of the nonassignment clause. In order to avoid char-
acterization as an assignment of the lease or as a sublease, the agreement
should avoid any implication that the contract miner has the exclusive right
to possession of the premises or owns the coal either before or after sever-
ence. Although neither party will want the contract mining agreement to con-
stitute a breach of the nonassignment clause in the underlying lease, the con-
tract miner's interests will be better protected if the agreement gives him
more than a bare license which is terminable at will.' Depending upon the
jurisdiction, the miner's interest will be better protected by creating an ease-
ment or license coupled with an interest.4
If the contract miner is willing to perform his services for a price related
to the market price of the coal, the contract mining agreement may be struc-
tured so that the contract miner receives a percentage of the gross or net
proceeds from the sale of the coal. This would allow the contract miner to
claim a depletion deduction against its income from the property.' In this
situation, care should be taken that the arrangement does not constitute a
partnership or violate any restrictions on assignment or subleasing.
The other principal terms of the contract mining agreement involve the
responsibilities of each party with respect to the operation of the mine, en-
' A bare license does not entitle the licensee to protection against interference with his use
by the licensor or third parties. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 14.2, n.19 (1981).
'See 4 COAL LAW AND REGULATION § 83.03[5] (D. Vish & P. McGinley ed. 1983).
.See supra notes 8 through 32 and accompanying text.
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vironmental and other eompliance matters and the respective liabilities of
the parties. The specimen contract imining agreement in the accompanying
article (the "Specimen Contract") exemplifies a contract mining agreement
protective of the owner's interests.6 Typically, the agreement will be drafted
so that the contract miner is an independent contractor, thus minimizing the
liability of the owner for injuries to employees of the contract miner, other
tort claimants, and for environmental and other regulatory requirements.
III. TAX ISSUES RELATED To CONTRACT MINING
In structuring a contract mining agreement, it is essential that all tax
aspects of the transaction be evaluated so that the desired tax treatment is
obtained. Before agreeing upon the method of compensating the contract
miner, the parties should consider the factors governing who is entitled to
claim depletion. The parties should also agree on responsibility for all other
tax matters, such as the federal reclamation fee, the black lung benefits ex-
cise tax and the various state taxes, including ad valorem real estate taxes.
A. Depletion
Section 611 of the Internal Revenue Code7 provides that in the case of
mining concerns "there shall be allowed a deduction in computing taxable in-
come a reasonable allowance for depletion."' Depletion allowance is calculated
by one of two methods, percentage depletion or cost depletion. Percentage
depletion is allowed under section 613 of the Internal Revenue Code' for
mines, wells and various enumerated natural deposits. The annual allowance
for percentage depletion applicable to coal is ten percent of the gross income
from the property (which excludes amounts paid for rents or royalties with
respect to the property on which the mining is taking place), but not more
than fifty percent of the income from the property computed without regard
to the depletion allowance. Percentage depletion is not limited to the tax-
payer's basis in the property, and thus the taxpayer is entitled to the deple-
tion allowance, even after its basis in the property is reduced to zero. Cost
depletion, which is provided for under section 612 of the Internal Revenue
Code," is calculated by deducting an appropriate portion of the taxpayer's
basis in the property for each ton of coal mined and sold." A separate deple-
tion calculation is required for each property.12 For any taxable year, the
See Gage supra note 1 at 841.
I.R.C. § 611 (1976).
For an excellent discussion on coal depletion allowance, see McMahon, Coal Depletion
Allowance, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 581 (1983).
I.R.C. § 613 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
10 I.R.C. § 612 (1976).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(1) (1983).
"I "Property" is defined in I.R.C. § 614 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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allowable depletion deduction for a property depends upon whether cost or
percentage depletion is greater. The taxpayer is required to utilize the
method which results in the greater deduction."
Percentage depletion was long characterized, like cost depletion, as a
method of recouping the owner's capital investment in the minerals, free of
tax. 4 More recently, however, the depletion allowance has more realistically
been viewed as a special incentive for engaging in the business of exploring
and developing mineral reserves. 5
A taxpayer is entitled to depletion only if he has an economic interest in
the coal in place." This criterion was first enunicated by the United States
Supreme Court in Palmer v. Bender,"' and later codified in Treasury Regula-
tion section 1.611-1(b)(1)."8
Treasury Regulation section 1.611-1(b)(1) attempts the difficult task of
drawing a distinction between an economic interest and an economic advan-
tage. Under that section, if the contract miner has made no investment in the
coal, it will be deemed to have merely an economic advantage, not a depleta-
ble economic interest. Generally, the depletion cases involving contract
miners attempt to define the difference between an economic interest and an
economic advantage.
The Supreme Court held in Parsons v. Smith 9 and Paragon Jewel Coal
Company v. Commissioner0 that a contract miner who is paid a fixed price
per ton or a price per ton that is not directly related to the market price does
not have the requisite economic interest and thus is not entitled to a deple-
I.R.C. § 613(a) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(a) (1983).
I, Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956).
, United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 576 (1981).
"See generally McMahon, Defining The "Economic Interest" In Minerals After United
States v. Swank, 70 KY. L. J. 23, 36 (1982).
17 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1983) provides in relevant part:
Annual depletion deductions are allowed only to the owner of an economic interest in
mineral deposits or standing timber. An economic interest is possessed in every case in
which the taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in place ... and
secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the
mineral ... to which he must look for a return of his capital .... A person who has no
capital investment in the mineral deposit ... does not possess an economic interest
merely because through a contractual relation he possesses a mere economic or
pecuniary advantage derived from production. For example, an agreement between the
owner of an economic interest and another entitling the latter to purchase or process
the product upon production or entitling the latter to compensation for extraction ...
does not convey a depletable economic interest.
359 U.S. 215 (1959).
" 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
[Vol. 86
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tion allowance. In Parsons v. Smith, the Court cited seven factors in
distinguishing an "economic interest" from an "economic advantage."'" Addi-
tionally, the Court held that a contract miner was not entitled to depletion
where he received a fixed fee per ton of coal delivered and was not authorized
to keep or sell any of the coal but was required to deliver all that was mined
to the owner.'
These seven factors were reviewed by the Court in Paragon Jewel Coal
Company, which held that a contract miner was not entitled to depletion
where the contract miner's fee, although not fixed, was not directly related
to the sales price of the coal and was payable regardless of whether the
owner was able to sell the coal in the market.' The owner bore the risk of a
decline in the market and the benefit of any rise in the market. Although the
miner's fee in the Paragon Jewel case was not fixed, it was adjusted
periodically to reflect general trends in the market. The fact that the con-
tract in that case was held to be terminable did not seem to affect the Court's
view as to the relative market risk of the parties.
The Parsons and Paragon Jewel cases, which involved payment of mining
fees unrelated to the market price, should be distinguished from the cases of
Ruston v. Commissioner24 and Brown v. Commissioner25 in which the contract
miner was paid a fixed percentage of the net selling price or net profits
2, The seven factors were:
(1) The contract miner's investment was in his equipment, all of which was
movable-not in the coal in place;
(2) The contract miner's investment in equipment was recoverable through
depreciation -not depletion;
(3) The mining contract was terminable without cause on short notice;
(4) The landowners did not agree to surrender to the contract miner and did not ac-
tually surrender any capital interest in the coal in place;
(5) The coal, at all times, even after it was mined, belonged entirely to the land-
owners, the contract miner could not sell or keep any of it and was rbquired to deliver
all that he mined to the landowners;
(6) The contract miner did not share in the proceeds from the sale of the coal, but
was paid a fixed sum for each ton of coal mined and delivered which fee was full compen-
sation for the performance of the contract miner's work and for the furnishing of all
labor and equipment required for the work; and
(7) The contract miner agreed to look only to the landowner for all sums to become
due it under the mining contract which did not grant the contract miner an interest in
the coal in place.
359 U.S. at 225.
' For other cases in which contract miners earning fixed fees per ton of minerals mined have
been denied depletion deductions, see Costantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1971); Mc-
Call v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847 (4th Cir.
1959); Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957 (1969); and Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.
528 (1957), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959).
380 U.S. at 635.
24 19 T.C. 284 (1952).
22 T.C. 58 (1954).
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realized from the sale of the coal. In the latter cases, the contract miner was
found to be entitled to claim depletion. This is consistent with the Supreme
Court's focus on which party bears the market risk.
In Ruston the lessee entered into a contract which gave the contract
miner the exclusive right to mine the coal, but the lessee retained title to the
coal both before and after extraction and retained the sole right to market
the coal. The contract provided that the contract miner was to receive eighty-
three percent of the net profits from the sale of the coal as compensation for
his services. The Tax Court, taking note that the contract miner looked solely
to the sale of the coal for its income, held that the contract miner had an
economic interest in the coal.28
Similarly, in Brown a contract miner was engaged to mine coal for a
percentage of the net profits from the sale of the coal. The Tax Court held
that the contract miner had an economic interest in the coal because the
miner's compensation was directly related to the sales price of the coal and it
had an exclusive right to mine the coal.' In addition, a contract miner which
receives a percentage of the net proceeds from the sale of the coal has an
economic interest even though it does not have an exclusive right to mine the
property.'
In the recent case of United States v. Swank," the Supreme Court held
that a contract miner has an economic interest in coal in place notwithstand-
ing the fact that the mining agreement was terminable on only thirty days'
notice." Therefore, even though Swank involved a lease, a contract miner
operating under a contract terminable without cause with at least thirty
days' notice may not be disqualified from claiming depletion for that reason
alone.
In summary, a contract miner should have a depletable economic interest
in the coal if his fee is based upon the market price for the coal. The taxpayer
need not have a property interest in the coal, either before or after mining,
nor have the right to sell it, so long as payment is due only upon sale of the
coal and is based on the market price at the date of sale. A contract mining
19 T.C. at 295.
2 22 T.C. at 61. It should also be noted that the contract mining agreement in the Brown case
was not terminable without cause.
Compare Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415 (1975) with Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 31 (1959); Victory Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 407 (1974);
and Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979). In the latter three cases, licensees who did not
have an exclusive right to extract minerals, but had the right to sell the minerals in question,
were found to have an economic interest.
451 U.S. 571 (1981).
451 U.S. at 585.
31 Rev. Rul. 73-470, 1973-2 C.B. 88; Private Letter Ruling 8216007.
[Vol. 86
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agreement intended to confer an economic interest in the coal on the contract
miner may inadvertently create a joint ventune or partnership, and thus par-
ticular attention should be paid to the consequences of such an arrangement.2
B. Surface Mining Reclamation Fees
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act33 (SMCRA) imposes a
reclamation fee on "operators" for each ton of coal produced in the United
States. This fee is paid into the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund ad-
ministered by the Secretary of the Interior for the purpose of reclaiming
mined areas. All "operators of coal mining operations" are subject to
SMCRA 4 and are required to pay a reclamation fee equal to the lesser of
$.35 per ton or 10% of the value of the coal produced by surface coal mining,
and the lesser of $.15 per ton or 10% of the value of the coal produced by
underground mining.' The value of the coal is determined at the time of the
"initial bona fide sale, transfer of ownership or use by the operator" im-
mediately after it is severed. 6
Under SMCRA an "operator" is "any person, partnership or corporation
engaged in coal mining who removes or intends to remove more than 250
tons of coal from the earth by coal mining within twelve consecutive calendar
months in any one location."3 Neither SMCRA nor the regulations contain
any further guidance with respect to whether the contract miner or the
owner or lessee of the coal will be liable for the reclamation fee. The pream-
ble to the enactment of the regulations, however, states that "Congress in-
tended the burden of fee payment to fall upon the person who stands to
benefit directly from the sale, transfer, or use of the coal," and that the "iden-
tification of operators will be made in light of the realities of the business
world and will not turn solely on a literal interpretation of the word
removes.' "8
SZ 4 COAL LAW AND REGULATION § 83.08[2][b] (D. Vish & P. McGinley ed. 1983).
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. V 1981).
All underground and surface coal mining operations are subject to the Act unless: (1) the
extraction of coal is made by a landowner (or lessee) for his own noncommercial use; (2) the extrac-
tion of coal is for commercial purposes but will be accomplished through surface mining operations
which will affect two acres or less during the life of the mine; (3) the extraction of the coal is inci-
dent to state or federal highway or other construction; (4) the extraction of coal is incidental to the
extraction of other minerals where the coal does not exceed 16-2/3 percent of the mineral tonnage
removed for commercial use or sale within any 12 consecutive month period; or (5) the coal ex-
tracted amounts to less than 250 tons of coal within a 12 consecutive month period. 30 C.F.R. §
870.11 (1982).
1 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (Supp. V 1981). This section also provides that the reclamation fee for
lignite coal shall be at a rate of 2% of the value of the coal at the mine or $.10 per ton, whichever
is less.
30 C.F.R. § 870.12(d)(1) (1982).
30 U.S.C. § 1291(13) (Supp. V 1981).
42 Fed. Reg. 62,713 (1977).
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The Office of Surface Mining (OSM) has issued a proposed rule which
would further define the party responsible for the reclamation fee. 9 Under
the proposed rule, the burden would fall on the person or entity that owns
the coal under state law immediately after it is severed, extracted or re-
moved. Thus, in the typical contract mining situation in which the contract
miner has no ownership interest in the coal, the owner will be liable for the
fee. 0 If, on the other hand, the contract mining agreement provides that the
contract miner has the right to extract and sell the coal and retain the princi-
ple portion of the sales proceeds, the contract miner will be liable for the
fee."' Liability for payment of the reclamation fee should be specifically
covered in the agreement.
C. Black Lung Benefits Excise Tax
The Black Lung Benefits Act of 19772 imposes an excise tax on the sale
of coal to finance benefits for persons suffering from black lung disease. This
tax is imposed on coal sold or used by the "producer" at the lower of $.50 per
ton or 2% of the sales price for coal from underground mines, or the lower of
$.25 per ton or 2% of the sales price for coal from surface mines located in
the United States.
43
Payment of the tax is the responsibility of the producer of the coal. The
term "producer" is defined as the person in whom ownership of the coal is
vested under state law immediately after the coal is severed from the
ground, without regard to the existence of any contractual arrangement for
the sale or other disposition of the coal or the payment of any royalties be-
tween the producer and any third party. For example, if the owner of the
coal leases the coal and the lessee extracts the coal and sells it, paying the
owner a fixed royalty, the lessee will be liable for the tax if, under state law,
the lessee is the owner of the coal immediately after the coal is severed from
the ground." On the other hand, if the owner contracts with a miner who is to
extract the coal for a set price per ton, the owner will be responsible for the
tax, since under state law he remains the owner of the coal immediately after
severance." Thus, a contract miner which has a sufficient interest in the coal
to constitute an economic interest for purposes of the depletion allowance
may also be considered a "producer" and, therefore, be responsible for the
payment the Black Lung Benefits Excise Tax.
48 Fed. Reg. 54,190 (1983).
:0 48 Fed. Reg. 54,191, Example (1) (1983).
1 48 Fed. Reg. 54,191, Example (2) (1983).
42 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (Supp. V 1981).
Treas. Reg. § 48.4121-1(b)(1) (1983).
" Treas. Reg. § 48.4121-1(a)(1) (1983).
" Treas. Reg. § 48.4121-1(a)(2), Example (2) (1983).
" Treas. Reg. § 48.4121-1(a)(2), Example (1) (1983).
[Vol. 86
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D. State Taxes
Other taxes that should be considered before drafting a contract mining
agreement are the various state severence or business occupation taxes that
may be incurred by the contract miner. These taxes are in addition to each
state's income, property, workman's compensation and unemployment in-
surance taxes.
1. Kentucky
Kentucky imposes a severance tax of 4.5% on the gross value of coal mined
in the state, with a minimum of $.50 per ton for each ton.47 The tax is imposed on
all coal "severed" and/or "processed" within Kentucky. The "taxpayer" is "any
individual, partnership, joint venture, association, or corporation engaged in
severing and/or processing coal" in Kentucky. 8 The statute further provides
that where a party contracts to sever and/or process coal, but does not obtain
title to that coal or does not have an economic interest therein, the party who
owns the coal or has an economic interest is the taxpayer.49 This economic in-
terest requirement is similar to the concept used in determining entitlement
to depletion for federal income tax purposes."0
Therefore, if the contract miner has an economic interest in the coal and
is thus entitled to claim depletion, it will be subject to the Kentucky
severance tax. If the contract miner is merely an independent contractor
earning a fixed fee per ton of coal mined or delivered, it will not be responsi-
ble for the tax.
The Kentucky Department of Revenue will not recognize a contractual
delegation of the duty to pay this tax. If a contract miner pays the tax pur-
suant to his obligations under a contract mining agreement, the Department
of Revenue will refund the payment by the contract miner and assess the tax
against the owner of the coal. In order to delegate this obligation effectively,
the contract miner must waive any right to the refund and assign it to the
owner.
51
2. Ohio
In addition to various income and corporate taxes, and unemployment in-
surance and workman's compensation taxes, Ohio imposes a severance tax
upon the "severer" of minerals.2 The severance tax is imposed on coal at a
:7 KY. REV. STAT. § 143.020 (1983).
1 Ky. REV. STAT. § 143.010(5) (1983).
49 Id.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 143.010(10) (1983).
Vish, Tax Consequences and Responsibilities, Eastern Mineral Law Foundation, Special
Institute on Contract Mining 30 (Sept. 14, 1982) (available from Eastern Mineral Law Foundation).
2 HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5749.02 (Baldwin 1982).
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rate of $.04 per ton mined in the state. In addition, a tax of $.01 per ton of
coal mined is imposed for a state reclamation fund. For purposes of the
severance tax, the "severer" is "any person who actually removes the natural
resources from the soil or water" in Ohio. 3 Even though the definition of
"severer" would appear on its face to include contract miners, it has been
held that where the contract miner is merely an independent contractor earn-
ing a set fee per ton of coal mined, the owner of the coal will be liable for the
severance tax."
No "person" may sever or sell a natural resource in Ohio without first ob-
taining a license or permit therefor." Unless such person has obtained a
license or permit from another department in the state, the fee for such per-
mit is $50.58
3. West Virginia
West Virginia imposes a Business and Occupation Tax on "every person
exercising the privilege of engaging ... in the business of severing, extract-
ing, reducing to possession and producing for sale, profit or commercial use
any natural resource products. 5 7 In the case of coal, the tax is assessed
against the "producer" of the coal at a rate of 3.5% of the gross sales pro-
ceeds." In addition, West Virginia imposes a tax of 0.35% of the value of the
coal produced in the state (based on the gross sales proceeds) for the purpose
of creating special municipal and county funds. The burden of this additional
tax also falls on the "producer" of the coal. 0
In West Virginia, the "producer" is any person who engages in the "sever-
ing, extracting, mining, quarrying, reducing to possession and producing for
sale, profit or commercial use" any coal either directly or by contracting with
others for the necessary labor or mechanical services." Moreover, the pro-
ducer is the person having an "economic interest" in the coal rather than one
with a mere "economic advantage."82 This is the same criterion used for
federal depletion. Indeed, the regulations cite several factors that will be con-
sidered in determining which party is the "producer," including which party
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5749.01 (Baldwin 1982).
1, N&G Construction, Inc. v. Lindley, 56 O.S.2d 415, 10 O.O.3d 521, 384 N.E.2d 704 (1978); and
Ohio ex rel. La Boiteaux Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, 61 O.S.2d 60, 399
N.E.2d 90 (1980).
0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5749.04 (Baldwin 1982).
5Id.
W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a (1983).
W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a (1983).
5' W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2 (1983).
W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a (1983).
W. VA. REG. B.O.T. § 1.2(a).A (1975).
W. VA. REG. B.O.T. § 1.2(a).C (1975).
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is entitled to the federal depletion allowance. 3 Other factors which will be
considered are whether the party has the exclusive right to mine the coal or
is obligated to pay royalties to another and whether there is an exclusive and
mandatory sales/purchase agreement between the parties.6 4 Accordingly, a
contract miner that is entitled to claim depletion will be subject to the West
Virginia Business and Occupation Tax as a producer.
A contract miner who is not liable for the tax as a producer will be liable
for the Business and Occupation Tax as a person engaging in a service
business in the state. 5 This tax is imposed for the privilege of doing business
in West Virginia and is levied upon the individual who performs the business
or service at a rate of 1.15/o of the gross income of such business.6 This tax
is not in addition to the tax imposed by West Virginia Code section 11-13-2.
Therefore, if the contract miner is deemed to be a producer, he will not be
subject to the 1.15% tax imposed by West Virginia Code section 11-13-26.
IV. LABOR CONSIDERATIONS
A. Introduction
Any person contemplating a contract mining arrangement should con-
sider not only the impact of the arrangement on labor relations with his own
employees, but also the potential impact of the owner's collective bargaining
agreements and labor relations on his proposed operations. An important
motive of the owner in a contract mining situation is to shift risks, burdens
and liabilities of the mining operation to the contract miner. Labor contracts
of owner or affiliated companies can have both direct and indirect conse-
quences upon contract mining operations of an independent contract miner.
Moreover, in the Appalachian coal fields, several unions including the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA), the Southern Labor Union, and the
Operating Engineers are actively engaged in efforts to organize new and ex-
isting mining operations and to preserve bargaining and representation
status in existing unionized operations.
Collective bargaining or wage agreements between owners and unions
may impose obligations on owners with respect to mining operations or prop-
erties proposed to be operated under a contract mining agreement. Contract
miners should be aware of specific labor law issues arising under owners'
labor agreements so that appropriate protection can be secured in the mining
contract. Contract miners should also be prepared to deal with picketing and
other union concerted activity which may arise in situations where labor
disputes arise under owners' labor agreements.
'3 Id.
1A Id.
W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2b (1981).
I !d.
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B. Maintaining Non-Union Status
A good example of this type of problem exists in situations where the
owner is a signatory to the National Bituminous Wage Agreement of 1981
(UMWA Agreement). A question arises as to whether an owner may enter in-
to a contract mining operation where the contract miner is to operate non-
union or with a different union.
Under the UMWA Agreement, two factors determine whether the owner
must require a contract miner to hire employees who are members of the
UMWA: whether the contract miner's operation is a new or existing opera-
tion and whether the owner lays off miners concurrently with the contract
miner's hiring of non-UMWA miners.
The present UMWA Agreement does not require a signatory owner to
require that a "new operation" employ members of the UMWA. There was
some ambiguity as to this question under the 1978 and previous versions of
the UMWA Agreement, but the Agreement was amended"7 in 1981 in accor-
dance with the position taken by the UMWA in the cases of Lone Star Steel
Co. v. NLRB' and Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB. 9 Article IA, section (f) now states
that the UMWA Agreement does not apply to any new operation unless and
until the UMWA is voluntarily recognized by the employer, certified by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), or otherwise properly obtains
bargaining rights at the new operation.
The UMWA also took the position in Amax"° that the "Successor Clause,"
The applicable articles of the National Bituminous Wage Agreement of 1981 (UMWA
Agreement), are Article I and Article IA, section (f). Article I now states in relevant part:
THIS AGREEMENT ... covers all of the bituminous coal mines described in Ar-
ticle IA, Section (f) owned or operated by said first parties ....
This Agreement shall be binding upon all signatories hereto . . . and their suc-
cessors and assigns. In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each
Employer promises that its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be sold, con-
veyed, or otherwise transferred or assigned to any successor without first securing the
agreement of the successor to assume the Employer's obligations under this Agreement.
Article IA, section (f) states:
As part of the consideration for this Agreement, the Employers agree that this
Agreement covers the operation of all the coal lands, coal producing and coal prepara-
tion facilities owned or held under lease by them, or any of them, or by any subsidiary
or affiliate at the date of this Agreement, or acquired during its term which may
hereafter (during the term of this Agreement) be put into production or use. This sec-
tion will immediately apply to any new operations upon the Union's recognition, cer-
tification, or otherwise properly obtaining bargaining rights. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the terms of this Agreement shall be applied without evidence of Union
representation of the Employees involved to any relocation of an operation already
covered by the terms of this Agreement.
639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
614 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
70 Ia.
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the second paragraph of Article I," applies only to the sale or other per-
manent disposition of an existing mining operation employing UMWA
members under the terms of the UMWA Agreement.
Article I, however, permits the UMWA to obtain bargaining rights at the
contract miner's operation if the owner controls the labor decisions made
there. The NLRB would likely view this type of relationship as an "accretion"
to the existing bargaining unit instead of a "new" operation. To avoid this
possibility, the contract miner should include in the contract and establish in
his day-to-day operations that he will control the activities of his employees.
While Articles I and IA, section (f) do not compel an owner to require the
contract miner to hire union employees, Article IA, section (h)72 of the present
UMWA Agreement prohibits a signatory from licensing or leasing coal lands
to a nonsignatory operator if layoffs result or are caused at the signatory's
other operations. Thus, the contract miner must be familiar with the owner's
other operations to determine what potential labor problems may arise in his
proposed operation.
However, not all leasing or licensing of a signatory's coal lands to a non-
signatory followed by layoffs at the signatory's operations necessarily con-
stitute a violation of Article IA, section (h). The layoffs must be the result of
the leasing or licensing before any violation can be demonstrated.
Two arbitration decisions73 hold clearly that a company's leasing program
did not violate Article IA, section (h). In National Mines Corporation and
UMWA, District 30, Local 1741,74 bad weather forced National Mines to
reduce the work week at its operations shortly after it had subleased "thin
seam" operations to independent operators. The arbitrator held that subleas-
ing did not violate the UMWA Agreement because bad weather was the ac-
tual cause of the layoffs. In Cannelton Industries, Inc. and UMWA, District
17, Local 1460,"s the arbitrator held that Cannelton's layoffs at its operations
" UMWA Agreement, supra note 67.
7 Article IA, Section (h) states:
The Employers agree that they will not lease, sublease or license out any coal
lands, coal producing or coal preparation facilities where the purpose thereof is to avoid
the application of this Agreement or any section, paragraph or clause thereof. Licensing
out of coal mining operations on coal lands owned or held under lease or sublease by any
signatory operator hereto shall not be permitted unless the licensing out does not cause
or result in the layoff of Employees of the Employer.
,1 Under the UMWA Agreement, mine workers file grievances if the mine worker believes
that a signatory has violated the provisions of the UMWA Agreement. UMWA Agreement,
Article XXIII. An arbitrator hears grievances if the mine workers and the employer cannot settle
the dispute.
" ARB 30-77-241 (March 21, 1977 Goldberg, Arb.).
, ARB 82-17-KD-151 (Dec. 13, 1982 Parkinson Arb.). See also Black Diamond Coal Mining Co.
and UMWA, District 20, Local 8460, ARB (not listed) (Dec. 1, 1982 Beckman, Arb.).
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five years after it leased two coal tracts to independent contractors also did
not violate Article IA, section (h).
On the other hand, several arbitration decisions have concluded that a
coal company's leasing program violates Article IA, section (h). In Union Car-
bide Corporation and UMWA, District 17, Local 6243,78 Union Carbide re-
quested that the UMWA terminate the common seniority unit at its mines,
and began to license its coal lands and lay off its employees when the UMWA
refused. The arbitrator held that Union Carbide's actions violated Article IA,
section (h) because of the close proximity between the UMWA's refusal to ac-
cede to Union Carbide's request and the subsequent licensing and layoffs. In
Big Bear Mining Company and UMWA, District 17, Local 7692,7 the arbitra-
tor held that a signatory violated Article IA, section (h) by licensing one mine
to an independent contractor, and subsequently laying off its employees at a
neighboring mine when the independent contractor began to produce coal.
However, none of those decisions emphasize or rely upon the important
distinction between the language of the two separate paragraphs of Article
IA, section (h).
The first paragraph deals with the leasing or licensing of coal lands and
coal production equipment and facilities. That paragraph, which prohibits
only those arrangements implemented for the purpose of avoiding the ap-
plication of the terms of the UMWA Agreement, has undoubtedly lost much
of its force with respect to coal lands as a result of the amendment to Article
IA, section (f). It is now clear that the UMWA Agreement does not
automatically apply to the signatory's coal lands, even after they are
developed into a coal mining operation, and that the UMWA must first
establish a right to recognition at the operation.
The second paragraph of Article IA, section (h) is limited to "coal mining
operations" and supports the argument that an ongoing mining operation
must be the subject of the licensing referred to in the second paragraph of
Article IA, section (h). That distinction would seem to indicate that the
layoffs at the signatory owner's operations are irrelevant unless the signa-
tory subcontracted what had been an active mining operation.
This distinction was further developed in Clinchfield Coal Company and
UMWA, District 28, Local 1452.71 Clinchfield had licensed small pockets of
coal to independent operators for over twenty years because it could not
economically mine the coal using conventional methods. The UMWA filed a
grievance after Clinchfield closed its Camp Branch No. 1 mine, claiming that
the continuing existence of the independent operations caused the shutdown
7, ARB 82-17-KD-171 (Dec. 17, 1982, Wren, Arb.).
ARB 81-17-82-367 (Nov. 15, 1982, Segal, Arb.). See also King Coal Co. and UMWA, District
20, Local 1865, ARB 20-1865-82-10 (Dec. 7, 1982, Phelan, Arb.).
11 ARB 81-28-82-122 (Oct. 30, 1982, Ables, Arb.).
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in violation of Article IA, section (h). The arbitrator held that a causal rela-
tionship existed between Clinchfield's traditional licensing policy and Clinch-
field's laying off its employees.
On appeal, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia79 reversed the arbitrator's decision in part because (1) the arbitrator
ignored the "coal mining operations" distinction in the second paragraph
because Clinchfield had licensed "lands" and not "coal mining operations";
and, (2) the layoffs were "caused" by the economic conditions in 1982 and not
by contracting policies that predated the layoffs by more than twenty years.
The contract miner should attempt to determine if the owner plans to lay
off his employees at his other operations simultaneously with the initiation of
the contract miner's proposed operation. If so, the contract miner must be
prepared to deal with labor problems which are likely to arise. If the owner's
employees are laid off, they are likely to file a grievance, which they are like-
ly to win, and the owner might be compelled to terminate his agreement with
the contract miner or seek to require the contract miner to become a
signatory of the UMWA Agreement." The contract miner should address
issues of this nature in negotiations and seek to cover them in the agreement.
C. The Union Contract Miner
In many situations, a unionized owner, because of specific provisions in a
collective bargaining agreement or the owner's labor relations policy, will re-
quire contract miners to become signatories to the owner's union agreement.
For example, although modifications to the UMWA Agreement in 1981 have
altered the situation to some extent, this custom or practice is frequently
followed in coal producing regions where the UMWA has organized most
employees. A miner contemplating a contract mining arrangement where the
owner imposes such a requirement must familiarize himself with the re-
quirements of these agreements and the federal law regulating the employ-
ment relationship.
For contract miners who have previously operated non-union mines,
adherence to a collective bargaining agreement may require significant
modification of previous labor practices in the areas of work assignment,
layoffs, incentives, discipline and work rules. Additionally, the wages and
fringe benefits required by such contracts can dramatically increase labor
costs and create other liabilities which are not apparent on the face of the
agreement.
Under the UMWA Agreement, signatories are required to participate in
' 556 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Va. 1983).
Most contract mining contracts permit the owner to terminate the contract in a very short
period of time after notice is given. The owner would likely invoke the termination clause if he
lost a grievance over work jurisdiction.
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and make contributions to the 1950 and 1974 UMWA pension plans. 1 This re-
quirement creates an inherent labor cost differential between UMWA pro-
duced coal and non-union coal. Obviously, the contracting parties are likely to
have taken this differential into account in negotiations. However, contract
miners should also assess the impacts of federal statutes such as the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as amended by the
Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA),2 which has special
impact on signatories to the UMWA Agreement. MPPAA imposes significant
liabilities on signatories to the UMWA Agreement upon cessation or substan-
tial curtailment of operations or upon withdrawal from participation in the
1950 and 1974 pension plans. 3
Care must be taken to assure that the possible economic incentives for a
decision to execute an owner's collective bargaining agreement are not
outweighed by hidden liabilities arising from the agreement itself or created
by applicable law.
V. LIABILITIES RELATED To THE CONTRACT
MINING RELATIONSHIP
A. Workmen's Compensation
In the typical situation, a contract miner is an "employer"84 and must
comply with the workmen's compensation statute in his state. 5 Compliance
with the statute will include the maintenance of workmen's compensation in-
surance to provide compensation for employees injured on the job.
An owner occasionally will hire an independent contractor to perform a
specific duty, for example shaft sinking, trucking or mining a portion of a
mining property, rather than operating the entire mine. The contract miner
who performs a specific duty is generally the classic independent contractor.
Even the contract miner who controls the entire mine site may be an in-
dependent contractor, depending on the contract terms.
A contract miner hired to perform a specific duty will be an "employer"
within the meaning of the worker's compensation laws if the owner does not
'1 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1981, Article XX.
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208
(1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
" See, Gabler, Minimizing the Impact of Withdrawal Liability under the Multiemployer
Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 707 (1983).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 21, 25 (Purdon 1952); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4123.01 (Baldwin 1982); VA. CODE § 65.1-3 (1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.610(2) (1983).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1603 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to -5-6
(1981 & Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.01-.99 (Baldwin 1982); VA. CODE§§ 65.1-1 to -163
(1980); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 342.001-.990 (1983).
8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5 (1981); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.29 (Baldwin 1982); VA. CODE § 65.1-103 (1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.340
(1983).
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reserve control over the means the contract miner uses to fulfill the terms of
the contract mining agreement, but merely reserves the right to approve the
final result. 7 A court will examine the following factors to determine if a con-
tract miner who performs a specific duty or the owner is in control of a par-
ticular employee and liable for the employee's injuries under workmen's com-
pensation: the terms of the contract mining agreement; the nature of the par-
ties' work or occupation; the skill required for performance; whether the con-
tract miner's. business is considered a business separate from the owner's
business; and, whether the owner makes the contract miner's day-to-day deci-
sions."
The contract miner may also have workmen's compensation respon-
sibilities under the "loaned employee" doctrine. 9 If the owner or anyone else
lends an employee to the contract miner and the loaned employee is injured
while working for him, the contract miner may be liable for the employee's
injury under workmen's compensation." The contract miner is liable for
workmen's compensation under this doctrine if he controls the loaned
employee's manner of performance (even though the lending employer re-
tains the right to discharge such employee), sends a replacement employee at
any time and evaluates the loaned employee's skills in the first instance.9"
While the payment of workmen's compensation insurance premiums in-
creases the employer's costs of doing business, workmen's compensation
statutes generally limit the employer's liability for work-related injuries.
Generally, workmen's compensation statutes provide an injured employee
with the exclusive remedy to recover damages for a work-related injury.92
" See, e.g., Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1982) (an owner who hires
a contractor to build a coke battery and vests exclusive control over the physical premises in the
contractor is not the employer of the contractor or any subcontractor's employees); See also
Daniels v. MacGregor Co., 2 Ohio St.2d 89, 31 Ohio Op.2d 141, 206 N.E.2d 554 (1965) (An employer
hired an individual to work exclusively for a customer and the customer had the right to control
the manner and means of how the employee performed his work. The customer is responsible for
employee's workmen's compensation). Healey v. Carey, Baxter & Kennedy, Inc., 144 Pa. Super.
500, 19 A.2d 852 (1941) (An employee of a trucking company was injured by a flying splinter from
a large piece of coal that an employee of the coal company was breaking on a coal truck. The coal
company hired the trucking company specifically to haul coal and each company maintained day-
to-day control over its employees and purchased workmen's compensation insurance. The court
held the trucking company responsible for the injury of its employee that occurred at the coal
company's mine site).
SId.
10 Nelson v. Borough of Greenville, 181 Pa. Super. 488, 124 A.2d 675 (1956).
9Id.
9, Branan v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 D.&C.3d 141 (Armstrong Co. 1980).
A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW. § 68.13, at 8-28 (1982); Bigley v. Unity Auto
Parts, Inc., 496 Pa. 262, 436 A.2d 1172 (1982). See also Fischer v. Sienna, 119 PA L. J. 350 (1971)
(An injured employee in Pennsylvania may file suit for common law damages if his employer com-
mits an intentional tort).
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West Virginia and Ohio, however, are exceptions to the general rule. In West
Virginia, an employer may be liable for common law damages in addition to
being liable under workmen's compensation, if he engages in willful, wanton
or reckless misconduct. 3 In Ohio, an employee is not precluded from enforc-
ing his common law remedies against his employer for a malicious tort94
despite Ohio's Worker's Compensation Act, which appears to limit an
employer's liability. 5
The contract miner must also be aware that if the owner hires him
specifically to perform an abnormally dangerous activity, the remedy of a con-
tract miner's injured employee is to file suit against the contract miner for
damages." The employees may not join the owner in the suit simply because
of his ownership status. The owner must actively participate in the
dangerous activity to be liable.'
In most cases, the contract miner and the owner will not bargain over
workmen's compensation issues because the contract miner will operate the en-
tire mine site and be solely responsible for workmen's compensation liability. If
both the owner and the contract miner plan to have employees at the mine site
and "loan" employees to one another, the agreement should address common
law liability for injuries to "loaned" employees.
B. Black Lung Benefits
1. State Black Lung Benefits
The contract miner should be aware that pneumoconiosis, more common-
ly known as black lung disease, is also compensable under state workmen's
compensation statutes. 8 A few notable differences exist when a claimant files
for workmen's compensation benefits for black lung disease as opposed to fil-
ing for benefits for a general injury. In Pennsylvania, the claimant can
receive compensation for black lung disease only if he has had an aggregate
employment of at least two years in Pennsylvania, during a period of ten
years preceding the date of disability in an occupation having a coal hazard.
In West Virginia, a claimant must meet the same test as in Pennsylvania or
"3 Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978). The West Virginia
Legislature amended W. Va. Code § 23-4-2 in response to Mandolidis and now permits employees
to recover common law damages only if the employer acted with "deliberate intention." W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-2 (Supp. 1983).
" Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 23 Ohio Op.3d 504, 433
N.E.2d 572 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 127 (1982).
'5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Baldwin 1982).
See supra note 87.
97 Id.
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1208(k) (Purdon 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68(Y) (Baldwin
1982). W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1981); VA. CODE § 65.1-46 (1980); Ky. REV. STAT. Chapter 342 (1983).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
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compile an aggregate employment of at least five years during a period of
fifteen years preceding the date of disability. ' ° The Kentucky statute states
that when a claimant has been exposed for ten years or more to an industrial
hazard sufficient to cause black lung disease, there is a rebuttable presump-
tion that his disability or death is due to black lung disease."' The statute
also states that any evidence presented should be construed liberally on
behalf of the claimant.' 2
Ohio does not include a rebuttable presumption in its statute but does re-
quire the claimant to file suit within eight years from the last injurious ex-
posure.' 3 Virginia requires the claimant to file a claim within three years
after diagnosis of the disease or within five years of the last injurious ex-
posure, whichever comes first.'
2. Federal Black Lung Benefits
The contract miner should also be aware of his employees' rights to black
lung benefits under federal law. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Amend-
ments Act of 1977 (Mine Safety Act)'0 ' provides coal miners with an alter-
native federal remedy to the state remedy for black lung benefits. The Mine
Safety Act requires a coal miner who believes he has acquired black lung
disease to first file for benefits under the applicable state workmen's compen-
sation statute if the state program provides benefits that the Secretary of
Labor considers to be equivalent to the benefits provided in the Mine Safety
Act.' 0 Apparently, Congress believed that an applicant would rarely file for
benefits under the Mine Safety Act because the state remedy would be suffi-
cient. The opposite has occurred, however, because the Secretary of Labor
has not recognized any state program as providing coverage that is
equivalent to federal coverage.' °0 Miners now generally file for benefits under
the state and federal law, and contract miners must carry black lung in-
surance under federal law in addition to their workmen's compensation in-
surance requirements under state law."'
Although the cost of black lung insurance varies from state to state, such
cost is significant in all states and contract miners should assess these costs
W0' XV. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1981).
KY. REV. STAT. § 342.316(2)(b)(3) (1983).
KY. REV. STAT. § 342.004 (1983).
,03 0lo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68 (Baldwin 1982).
,0 VA. CODE § 65.1-52 (Supp. 1983).
,05 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-936 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This Act was originally entitled the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. It was amended in 1977 to regulate the mining of all
minerals.
-cc 30 U.S.C. §§ 923, 931 (Supp. V 1981).
20 C.F.R. § 722.152(b) (1983).
,03 30 U.S.C. § 943 (Supp. V 1981).
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in evaluating mining opportunities. Potential liability for black lung benefits
was reduced somewhat by implementation of the Black Lung Benefit Reform
Act of 1981 (Reform Act). The Reform Act eliminated three presumptions
that claimants relied on to receive benefits."" This resulted in a reduction in
the number of awards and a corresponding reduction in black lung insurance
rates.
If a mine employee develops evidence of black lung disease, he has a
right to request a transfer from his position to another area of the mine site
where the respirable dust level is below one milligram of dust per cubic
meter.11 ° A miner who has requested a transfer will not be entitled to receive
the wage increases he would have received if he had remained in his prior
position.' The Mine Safety Act also prohibits mine operators from discharg-
ing or otherwise discriminating against a mine employee in any other way
because he suffers from black lung disease."'
C. Safety and Health
1. Mine Safety and Health Amendments of 1977
A contract miner, who is an operator, must comply with the mandatory
safety standards and other provisions of the Mine Safety Act."' There is
little question as to who is liable for a violation of the Mine Safety Act when
the contract miner has total control of the mine site. It is the policy of the
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) to cite the contract miner in
that situation for any violations of the Act.'
The difficult questions of liability for violations of the Mine Safety Act
arise when the owner hires the contract miner to perform a specific service
11 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2), (c)(4), (c)(5) (Supp. V 1981). Claimants were previously accorded a
presumption that they suffered from black lung disease based on the number of years worked in
coal mines and positive chest roentgengram readings.
1,0 30 U.S.C. § 843(b) (Supp. V 1981).
" Higgins v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979);
Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1981).
.12 30 U.S.C. § 938 (Supp. V 1981).
1,3 0 U.S.C. §§ 806-962 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 802(d) of the Mine Safety Act defines
an operator as any owner, lessee, or other person who operates, controls or supervises a coal or
other mine or any independent contractor performing services or construction at such mine. An
operator is subject to warrantless inspections under the Mine Safety Act and courts have held
that these inspections do not violate the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 490 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978), aff'd, 606 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); Marshall v.
Donofrio, 465 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1102 (1980).
11, Austin Powder Co., 2 MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 2128 (1983) (ALJ Koutras); see
also infra note 117.
[Vol. 86
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss3/13
CONTRA CT MINER'S PERSPECTIVE
and not operate the entire mining operation. As stated earlier, the contract
miner who performs a specific service is considered the classic independent
contractor. MSHA, with the approval of the courts, originally cited the
owner, as well as the contract miner who performs a specific service, for any
violations committed by the contract miner.'15 Owners protested this proce-
dure vigorously because they were being cited for violations regardless of
their culpability. The Secretary of Labor promulgated regulations that appor-
tion liability between the owner and contract miner based upon responsibili-
ty for the violations."6 A decision issued by a Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission judge upheld the Secretary's new policy."7
The contract miner should note that a Mine Safety and Health Ad-
ministrative Law Judge refused to uphold a clause in a contract mining
agreement where a contract miner attempted to limit his liability for viola-
tions of the Mine Safety Act."' In Austin Powder Company, the contract
miner argued that he was not liable for any violations under the Mine Safety
Act because a clause in his contract with the owner stated that when the con-
tract miner's employees entered the owner's property, they automatically
became employees of the owner."' Judge Koutras ignored that clause in the
contract and focused on the actions of the contract miner's employees and
their responsibilities to determine liability.
The fact that the Administrative Law Judge refused to recognize the
limitation of liability clause between a contract miner and an owner would
not necessarily alter a contract miner's civil remedies. If a contract miner has
persuaded the owner to indemnify him for civil penalties assessed under the
Mine Safety Act, a state court might uphold the indemnification agreement
and require the owner to make the appropriate payments.20 It is doubtful,
however, that a state court would enforce an indemnification provision where
the owner agreed to indemnify the contract miner for any criminal fines
levied against him. 2'
" Cyrus Industrial Minerals Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 664
F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1981); Harman Mining Corp. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 671 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1981).
£,0 30 C.F.R. Part 45 (1982).
"' Austin Powder Co., 2 MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 2128 (1983). In Austin Powder,
Judge Koutras focused on the respective responsibilities of the coal owner and independent con-
tractor to determine liability under the Mine Safety Act. The Judge rejected the old test of citing
the owner for every alleged violation committed by the independent contractor.
"' Id.
" Id. at 2130.
£25 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, §§ 1750A, 1752 (3d ed. 1972 & Supp.
1983).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1979). The parties should be aware that civil
fines are not deductible as a business cost.
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2. State Mine Safety and Health Laws
The contract miner will also be liable for any violations of the applicable
state mine safety and health laws. For example, Pennsylvania regulates
health and safety for underground anthracite coal mines by the Anthracite
Coal Mine Act,'22 underground bituminous coal mines by the Bituminous Coal
Mine Act,' and surface mines by either the Anthracite or Bituminous Act,
depending on the nature of the coal.124 In addition, Pennsylvania has a
number of Qther acts that regulate different aspects of coal mining."' The
Ohio, "'26 West Virginia,"= Virginia 2 ' and Kentucky'19 health and safety laws are
somewhat simpler; one law applies to all coal mines. In each state, regardless
of the complexity of the state program, the contract miner must comply with
both federal and state laws and regulations, and is subject to inspections to
ensure compliance.
In the typical situation, the representative of the state mine safety and
health agency will cite the contract miner for any violations at the mine site
because the contract miner is usually in control of the entire mine site. Prior
experience with state agencies indicates that when the owner hires the con-
tract miner to perform a particular job, state agencies generally apply a test
similar to the one used by MSHA for independent contractors and cite the
party responsible for any violations of state law. The contract miner should
employ the same strategy for state health and safety citations as he employs
for MSHA citations and attempt to persuade the owner to indemnify him for
any civil penalties assessed by the state agency.
D. Environmental Concerns
1. Surface Mining
SMCRA'2 ' establishes a general regulatory program administered by the
Department of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining, regulating environmen-
tal effects of both surface and underground mining. Each state may develop
its own regulatory program and assert and exercise primary jurisdiction
over coal mining, as long as that program is as effective as the federal pro-
gram under SMCRA.'3 ' Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky and
"' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 70-101 to -1405 (Purdon 1966 & Supp. 1983).
.. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 701-101 to -706 (Purdon 1966 & Supp. 1983).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4b (Purdon Supp. 1983).
'5 See infra note 138.
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4151.01(A)-4157.99 (Baldwin 1982).
2 W. VA. CODE §§ 22-2-1 to -3-6 (1981).
" VA. CODE §§ 45.1-1 to -225 (1974).
" Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 352.010-.620 (1983).
120 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. V 1981).
13, 30 U.S.C. § 1235(d) (Supp. V 1981).
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Virginia have secured "primacy" for their regulatory programs, and mining
operations conducted in these states must comply with the state regulations. '32
Although the requirements vary widely from state to state, each state
agency requires that a permit be acquired before surface or underground
mining may be initiated or continued at the mine site. The permit applicant is
to provide at least the following information: (1) who will conduct the mining
operation and where it will be located; ' 3 (2) the methods of extraction to be
used;1 34 (3) the effect of the operation on the hydrologic balance of the permit
and adjacent areas;" (4) whether the land can be restored successfully;' 3 and,
(5) whether the operator can provide a financial guarantee that the land will
be restored. 37 If the state agency is satisfied that this information meets the
guidelines established by the state program, the permit can be issued."
An issue arises as to who must apply for the permit, the owner or the
contract miner. In the typical situation, the contract miner usually obtains
the permit. This question is extremely important because the permittee is
generally accountable to the state regulatory agency if any of the mining or
'3 25 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 86-90 (Shepherd's 1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-6-1 to -42 (1981); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1513.01-.99 (Baldwin 1982 & Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 45.1-226 to .7 (Supp. 1983);
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 350.010-.990 (1983).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1513.07(B)(2)(a)(v) (Baldwin 1982 & Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE §
20-6-10(a)(1)(E) (1981); VA. ADMIN. REGS. V 778.13(a)(5) (1983); 405 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 8:030E.2.(1)(e)
(1983).
," PA. ADMIN. CODE § 87.62 (Shepherd's 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1513.07(B)(2)(g) (Baldwin
Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 20-6-10(a)(7) (Supp. 1983); VA. ADMIN. REGS. V 780.11(a) (1983); 405 Ky.
ADMIN. REGS. 8:03E.29 (1983).
'. PA. ADMIN. CODE § 87.69 (Shepherd's 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1513.07(B(2)(k) (Baldwin
Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 20-6-13(b)(10) (Supp. 1983); VA. ADMIN. REGS. V 779 (1983); 405 Ky. AD-
MIN. REGs. 8:030E.12 (1983).
' PA. ADMIN. CODE § 87.68 (Shepherd's 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1513.07(C) (Baldwin
Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 20-6-13(b)(2), (3) (Supp. 1983); VA. ADMIN. REGS. V 780.18 (1983); 405 Ky.
ADMIN. REGS. 8:030E.24 (1983).
'-" PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 86.141-185 (Shepherd's 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1513.07(B(2)(q)
(Baldwin Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 20-6-12 (Supp. 1983); VA. ADMIN. REGS. V 800-V 809 (1983); 405
Ky. ADMIN. REGS. § 10:03E (1983).
'u The applicant in Ohio should note that he must also meet the statutory criteria listed in
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which is incorporated into the Ohio program. The appli-
cant in West Virginia must also meet the statutory criteria in the Dam Control Act of 1973, W.
VA. CODE §§ 20-5D-1 to -14 (1981 & Supp. 1983) and the Water Pollution Control Act, W. VA. CODE
§§ 20-5A-1 to -24 (1981 & Supp. 1983). The applicant in Pennsylvania must note that any remedies
under the following acts are preserved: The Clean Streams Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§
691.1-760.2 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1983); The Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§
4001-4106 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1983); The Dams Safety and Encroachments Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, §§ 693.1-.27 (Purdon Supp. 1983); The Coal Refuse Disposal Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§
30.51-.66 (Purdon Supp. 1983); The Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, §§ 6018.101-.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1983); and The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conser-
vation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-.21 (Purdon Supp. 1983). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 1396.4(3) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
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reclamation work is not performed in accordance with statutory and
regulatory guidelines.139 Pennsylvania is an exception to the general rule and
holds the owner who obtains a permit, and the contract miner who performs
the mining operations, jointly and severally liable for any violations of state
law committed at the mine site.14
The contract miner must also be aware of possible liability for post-
mining pollution discharges or other conditions constituting public nuisances.
One court has held that the current mine operator is liable for any acid mine
discharges from the mine site, even if the discharge does not originate at the
mine site and results from the actions of others."' Another court held the oc-
cupant who caused a nuisance and the owner who knew of the nuisance and
received rents from the occupant for over twenty years jointly and severally
liable for the nuisance."' While state agencies usually cite the permittee for
regulatory violations, the cases demonstrate that liability for acts that harm
the environment is not necessarily limited to the permittee"' The contract
miner should analyze in detail current and past mining operations at or near
the proposed operation to determine the potential for post-mining discharges
or other conditions constituting nuisances.
The contract miner should attempt to cover the question of liability for
post-mining discharges and other nuisances in his agreement with the owner.
His primary goal in the environmental area is to limit his liability and finan-
cial commitment for any environmental problems at the mine site.
2. Underground Mining- Subsidence
The contract miner who conducts an underground mining operation
should be aware of his possible liability to the surface owner for mine sub-
sidence and of the potential that a state regulatory agency might limit the
percentage of underground extraction.' The surface owner is entitled to the
right of support unless the surface owner waived this right. 40 The contract
'" See supra notes 133-138.
".. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.3(a)}b) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
"' Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977), appeal dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 807 (1979).
12 Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142
(1978), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, National Wood Preserves Inc. v. Department of Envtl.
Resources, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 803 (1980).
143 See supra notes 141-42.
14 30 U.S.C. § 1266(b) (Supp. V 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1983); 25
PA. ADMIN. CODE § 89.145 (Shepherd's 1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1513.35(A)(1), (A)(10), (B)
(Baldwin Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE§ 20-6-14(b)(1), (b)(10), (c) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 45.1-243 (Supp.
1983); 405 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. § 8:040E.26 (Supp. 1983).
"' Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15 (1880); Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va.
665, 97 S.E. 186 (1918); Ohio Colleries Co. v. Cocke, 140 N.E. 356 (Ohio 1923); Clinchfield Coal Corp.
v. Compton, 139 S.E. 308 (Va. 1927); Case v. Elk Horn Coal Corp., 276 S.W. 573 (Ky. 1927).
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miner should obtain relevant title documents or secure assurances from the
mineral owner that the right to mine without liability for mine subsidence ex-
ists. 4 ' He should also be aware that the question of whether the surface
owner waived his right to surface support is answered by state law.
147
E. Public Participation In Permitting And Other Procedures Mandated by
SMCRA
One of the stated purposes of SMCRA is: "[to] assure that appropriate
procedures are provided for the public participation in the development, revi-
sion, and enforcement of regulations, standards, reclamation plans, or pro-
grams established by the Secretary or any State under this Act ... ,,118
SMCRA and OSM's implementing regulations, fulfill this purpose. The
''public" has been given the opportunity to participate in all aspects of state
primacy programs from initial permitting of mining operations to bond
release procedures upon completion of mining and reclamation. Such par-
ticipation includes opportunities for comment and hearing on permit deci-
sions,' access to mining properties during inspections,'50 rights to appeal
from regulatory actions on permits, 5' citizen's suit to compel enforcment,
awards of attorney and expert witness fees"2 and the right to initiate pro-
ceedings to have lands declared unsuitable for surface mining."3 Apart from
substantive considerations and issues involved in such public participation in
all aspects of the regulatory process, one of the significant impacts of
SMCRA is the creation of the potential for delay in all aspects of mine per-
mitting. At every significant stage of the process, public participation can
cause delay in regulatory actions necessary for the initiation, continuation or
termination of a mining operation. It is absolutely essential that persons con-
templating a contract mining arrangement or any operation familiarize
themselves with not only the substantive regulatory requirements, but also
the attitudes of the "public" toward the proposed operation. If hostility ex-
ists, it may be assumed that some delays will be encountered. Provisions
covering the consequences of such delays should be negotiated in mining
agreements.
Finally, under section 522 of SMCRA and cognate provisions of state
laws and primacy programs, it is possible that the lands upon which a pro-
posed operation is to be conducted may be declared unsuitable for surface
Id.
"' 48 Fed. Reg. 24,638 (1983). See supra note 145.
148 30 U.S.C. § 1202(i) (Supp. V 1981).
30 U.S.C. § 1263 (Supp. V 1981).
30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
151 30 U.S.C. § 1264(f) (Supp. V 1981).
152 30 U.S.C. § 1275(e) (Supp. V 1981).
30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. V 1981).
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mining operations. '54 This can occur even where the owner is otherwise recog-
nized to have the right to mine the property and the land is located in the
midst of other mining operations.
F. Wage and Mechanic's Liens
The contract miner is responsible to his employees for their wages and
fringe benefits. 55 Consequently, the contract miner is subject to any wage or
mechanic's liens filed by his employees if he fails to honor the wage agree-
ment. '56 He is also subject to any mechanic's liens filed by suppliers.
The contract miner in West Virginia has the additional burden of having
to file a wage bond with the state if his company has not been doing business
in West Viriginia for at least five years.'57 When a wage bond statute does
not exist or is not applicable, the contract miner should avoid being required
to furnish the owner with a wage bond. The contract miner should also at-
tempt to avoid the inclusion of a clause in the contract requiring him to in-
demnify the owner for any costs the owner may incur if any liens are filed
against the owner because of the miner's failure to make appropriate
payments.'58
VI. THE CONTRACT MINING AGREEMENT
A. Introduction
The Specimen Contract in the accompanying article is a good example of
an agreement drafted to protect the interests of the owner. Needless to say,
a contract miner presented with a draft in this form will want to negotiate
certain different and additional terms. In this section we examine the con-
tract mining agreement from the contract miner's perspective and discuss
various alternative provisions intended to protect his interest.
30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. V 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, 1396.4e (Purdon Supp. 1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1513.073 (Baldwin Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 20-6-22 (1981); VA. CODE § 45.1-252
(Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 350.610 (Supp. 1983).
"I Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp., 281 S.E.2d 238 (W. Va. 1981). Fringe benefits may include ac-
crued vacation pay, unused sick leave, pension and benefit trust payments, sickness and accident
benefits, and liquidated damages incurred by the contract miner for nonpayment of wages. Id.
'0 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 221 (Purdon 1964); PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 49, §§ 1101-1902 (Purdon 1965
and Supp. 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1311.34-1311.37 (Baldwin 1982); W. VA. CODE § 38-2-1
to -39 (1981 and Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 376.010 (1981).
W. VA. CODE, § 21-5-14 (1981).
IS The contract miner's employees may file a mechanic's lien against him or the coal owner.
Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp., 281 S.E.2d 238 (W. Va. 1981). Items subject to lien include equipment,
buildings or structures, and courts construe these terms broadly to satisfy liens. Id.
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B. Representations
Representations in a contract are intended to set forth many of the basic
factual assumptions on which the contract is based. In the event of a material
breach of a representation or warranty, the injured party has a cause of ac-
tion for damages or rescission, or perhaps fraud. Contract mining agreements
do not generally contain separate representations such as might be found in a
loan agreement or an asset purchase agreement. Instead, the representations
are dispersed throughout the agreement in close proximity to the related
covenants.
Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Specimen Contract are fairly typical of pro-
visions found in most owner-drafted contract mining agreements. They pro-
vide that the contract miner accepts the premises in their existing condition
and acknowledges that he has made an investigation of the premises, the
equipment required and all other aspects of the proposed mine, including la-
tent dangers and dangerous conditions. The owner expressly disclaims any
representations as to the quantity, quality or mineability of the coal, the con-
dition of the premises or his title thereto. The intent of these paragraphs is
to shift to the contract miner all the risks associated with the mining opera-
tion, including title and condition of the premises. Although these provisions
may be effective to shift these risks as between the parties to the agreement,
these provisions may not have an effect on the rights of employees of the con-
tract miner or other third parties.
Unless these provisions represent bargained for concessions by the con-
tract miner, his interests would be better served by including in the contract,
in lieu of paragraphs 25 and 26, a provision containing representations on cer-
tain underlying factual matters and an indemnity provision in which the
owner agrees to indemnify the contract miner for any claims, liabilities or
losses sustained as a result of breach of any of the representations. The
following discussion covers some of the areas which should be addressed by
such representations.
1. Title
One of the principal areas of concern to the contract miner is the owner's
right to mine the coal covered by the contract. If the owner's mining rights
are derived from a lease, a copy of the lease, including all amendments,
should be attached to the agreement or furnished to the contract miner prior
to signing. The owner should represent to the miner that such copy is a true
and correct copy of the lease, that the lease is in full force and effect on the
date of the agreement and that there are no existing defaults under the lease
or events which, with the lapse of time or notice, or both, would become an
event of default thereunder. In addition, the contract miner should ask the
owner to furnish the miner with a copy of all title opinions and engineering
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data, including records of core drillings and surveys of the premises and prior
workings, which are in the possession or control of the owner.
2. Dangerous Conditions on the Premises
Where an owner knows or should have known of dangerous conditions on
the premises and an employee of the contract miner is injured as a result of
such condition, the owner may be liable to the injured employee and the in-
surance carrier paying workmen's compensation benefits to the injured
employee."5 9 Although it may be desirable for the contract miner to have a
representation from the owner that the owner knows of no latent dangers or
dangerous conditions on the premises, in practice such a representation may
be difficult to obtain, since one of the principal concerns of the owner in
structuring the contract mining relationship is to shield himself from liability
for injuries to employees of the miner.
3. Environmental Matters
A contract miner who enters into possession of the premises and partial-
ly contributes to the continuation of an environmental violation may become
liable to abate a condition to which he is only a minor contributor."' Accord-
ingly, prior to signing the agreement the contract miner should investigate
the premises for possible environmental violations and make inquiries of local
regulatory authorities to determine the existence of any environmental viola-
tions on the property. In addition, the contract miner should seek a represen-
tation from the owner that there are no existing violations of environmental
laws or any outstanding judgments or decrees related to the premises.
Where the owner has previously obtained the necessary mining permits and
bonds, the contract miner will want to review copies of these documents and
should ask for a representation that such permits and bonds are in full force
and effect. If any permits or bonds are to be transferred to the contract
miner, the agreement should contain a representation that all required con-
sents to such transfer have been obtained.
If the miner is to secure the permits, the agreement should deal with the
situation where some or all permits cannot be secured or where permit is-
suance is delayed.
C. Indemnity Provision
In order to define the consequences of a breach of a representation, the
contract miner should require an indemnity clause indemnifying it against
"' Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivens, 276 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960);
Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Betram & Thacker, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. App. 1978).
'" Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 9 Pa. Commw. 1, 303 A.2d 544 (1973), rev'd, 455
Pa. 392, 391 A.2d 871 (1974), on remand, 23 Pa. Commw. 496, 353 A.2d 471 (1976), aff'd, 472 Pa. 115,
371 A.2d 461, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977).
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any claims, liabilities or damages arising out of a breach of a representation
by the owner. In addition, the contract miner should be indemnified against
all costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the miner in connection
with such breach since, in most jurisdictions, these amounts may not be
recoverable unless specifically provided by contract.161
D. Work to be Performed
The Specimen Contract contains a general description of the work to be
performed and a broad standard of performance applicable to the work.
Paragraph 7 of the Specimen Contract requires a contractor to promptly com-
mence and diligently prosecute its operations in a careful, skillful and
workmanlike manner, in accordance with recognized modern methods and
practices, so as to secure the greatest possible recovery of mineable coal.
This provision raises a myriad of questions which, if a dispute arises, can
ultimately be resolved only by a judge or a jury based upon possibly conflict-
ing testimony of the parties and their expert witnesses. Thus, a contract
miner is far better served by a more definite description of the work and the
particular standards to be applied.
E. Payment Terms
1. Introduction
The contract miner is typically paid a set fee for each ton of coal mined
although there may be situations in which the contract miner is paid a
percentage of the gross or net sales proceeds. His fee is compensation for all
of his work and services under the contract, including reclamation work and
other obligations. Occasionally, the owner will insist that such payment
covers all losses, damages and expenses related to unforeseen obstructions or
difficulties, but this may present a conflict with the indemnity by the owner
for misrepresentations." 2 The fee is structured as a payment for services to
protect the owner's claim to an economic interest in and title to the coal, thus
preserving its claim to depletion. In addition, characterizing the payment as a
payment for services strengthens the owner's claim that the contract does
not constitute a sublease. Typically the intention of the parties is to desig-
nate the contract miner as an independent contractor to avoid liability by the
owner for certain of the contract miner's actions.
2. Methods of Computation
Payment may be made either on a clean coal basis, a raw coal basis or
some combination of the two. Where payment is made on a raw coal basis,
there are relatively few grounds for dispute concerning the amount of the
... S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 786 (3d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1983).
162 Id.
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payment, since there are no questions about the accuracy of the sampling
procedure or the efficiency of the owner's washing or preparation plant. This
is an advantage to both the owner and the contract miner; however, it pro-
vides a contract miner with little incentive to eliminate rock and dirt during
the mining process. Payment on a clean coal basis provides a strong incentive
in this regard but involves all the complexity associated with determining
what is the clean coal tonnage.
There are various ways for overcoming the problems in determining
clean coal tonnage. One method is to base payment on raw coal tonnage after
deduction of a certain percentage of the weight, as determined from the ash
or moisture content of the coal. This reduced weight is the basis for payment
under the agreement. In such a case, the contract would include as an exhibit
a schedule showing various ash or moisture levels and the corresponding
percentage of the coal which is to be treated as reject. A second method is to
determine the reject percentage based upon the ash or moisture level and
deduct a certain percentage of weight for each incremental increase in the
ash or moisture level above a certain base level. A third method is to deter-
mine the reject percentage by performing a sink/float analysis at a particular
specific gravity and converting that analysis to a reject percentage and ad-
ding a certain percentage to account for plant inefficiency. Finally, a fourth
method is to determine the price on a sliding scale based upon the ash and
ash/moisture or Btu content of the coal.
3. Sampling Procedure
The sampling and testing procedures under any of the payment methods
based on coal quality are of critical importance to the parties. At a minimun,
the contract miner should have the right to inspect the sampling procedure if
the owner is performing the sampling. In addition, the miner may insist on
the right to have the sampling performed by an independent testing labora-
tory or have other options where there is a dispute as to the sampling of test-
ing procedure.
4. Purchase Option for Rejected Coal
The owner may insist on the right to reject any coal which fails to meet
certain specifications. Under these circumstances, the contract miner may
wish to have a provision reserving the right to purchase any rejected coal at
a predetermined price.
5. Time of Payment
Payment is normally made on a regular basis. For a contract miner facing
normal cash flow problems, a semi-monthly basis with payment ten days after
the last delivery is a desirable payment term. All payments should be accom-
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panied by certified weight slips. Some owners may seek to limit the time in
which payments are subject to challenge, but a contrat miner will naturally
seek to keep this private statute of limitations fairly long, perhaps six months
to one year.
For long term contracts there should be some price adjustment
mechanism. These provisions are very well developed in long term coal sup-
ply contracts. Typically, these provisions are based on certain indexes which
reflect escalation in labor, fuel and other costs of mining. In addition, there
may be a price opener clause under certain circumstances; however, space
does not permit a full discussion of the variety of factors relevant to these
provisions.'63
Where the method of payment creates certain penalties, it would be
natural for the contract miner to insist that there be certain bonuses as well.
For example, the contract miner might ask for some form of production
bonus if average production for the month exceeds a set production level.
The contract miner would then be entitled to a fixed or sliding scale bonus
for each ton produced.
F. Term
The term of a contract mining agreement will vary depending upon the
respective objectives of the owner and the contract miner and their relative
bargaining power. If the owner has the equipment, manpower and experience
to mine the coal itself, the contract mining agreement may be entered into as
a means for adding additional mining capacity when demand is strong. In that
case, the owner will likely seek to make the term of the agreement consistent
with his view of how long the demand will last or at least will want an early
termination provision without penalty. This will not be a situation in which a
contract miner should make a significant investment in equipment or
development costs since an early termination may occur before the contract
miner has recouped his investment. If the contract miner is expected or re-
quired to make a substantial capital investment in connection with the mine,
the contract miner will seek a long-term contract to protect his investment or
at least insist on a liquidated damage clause in the event of early termination.
On the other hand, the contract miner may want a short term relationship
where he is not required to make significant capital expenditures and has a
short term availability of equipment and manpower.
"' See generally Carney and Metz, Risk Allocation in the Long-Term Coal Sales Agreement,
1 E. MIN. L. INST. 9-1 (1980). Perl & Dunbar, Indexing Coal and Other Mineral Contracts, 3 E. MIN.
L. INST. 1-1 (1982).
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The term of the agreement may also be influenced by such legal con-
siderations as whether the mining relationship is to be structured as a con-
tract in order to avoid violation of a nonassignment clause in the owner's
lease. In that situation, the parties will seek a shorter term since it
strengthens the argument that the contract does not constitute an assign-
ment of the lease.
Following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Swank, neither the term of the agreement nor the existence of an
early termination provision will be determinative of whether the contract
miner is entitled to claim depletion for federal income tax purposes.
The Specimen Contract provides for an initial term of one year with an
automatic renewal, absent notice of termination. The agreement terminates
upon removal of all mineable coal and compliance by the contract miner with
all applicable laws. Naturally, there are various other options as to the term
of the contract. It may provide for a fixed term, with a right of renewal by
either the owner or the contract miner. In absence of a specific term, the
agreement will be terminable at will."4
When the agreement provides that it has a fixed primary term and will
continue "so long as coal is being mined on the property," the agreement will
end automatically after the primary term if the contract minei is not then
producing coal from the property. If the miner is producing coal at the end of
the primary term, the agreement will terminate automatically when the
miner ceases production. No notice or other affirmative act of the owner is
necessary to effect the termination.165
G. Early Termination Absent Default
The contract mining agreement may contain a provision providing for
termination without cause upon sixty or ninety days notice at the option of
the owner or the contract miner, or both. If the contract miner is required to
make a significant capital investment or incur substantial development ex-
penses and the owner insists on an early termination clause, the contract
miner will want to insist that the contract include a liquidated damage clause
or other form of compensation for the contract miner's unrecovered capital
investment at the date of termination. A typical liquidated damage clause
might give the contract miner the option to require the owner to purchase
'" Berry v. Walton, 366 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1963); Warren v. Cary-Glendon Coal Co., 313 Ky.
178, 230 S.W.2d 638 (1950).
1" Dethloff v. Ziegler Coal Co., 82 Ill.2d 393, 412 N.E.2d 526 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910
(1981); Brown v. Haight, 435 Pa. 12, 255 A.2d 508 (1969); Freemont Lumber Co. v. Starrell
Petroleum Co., 228 Ore. 180, 364 P.2d 773 (1961). See generally Armstrong and Dixon, Dollar
Related Clauses in Coal Leases, 2 E. MIN. L. INST. 9.03 (1981).
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the fixtures and equipment at their depreciated book value and reimburse or
share unamortized development costs.
Where there is a gross disparity in bargaining power between the owner
and the contract miner, the owner should not be so zealous and demand that
the contract be totally one-sided. Such a contract, particularly the termina-
tion provision, may be deemed to be unconscionable by analogy to section
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code and may thus be unenforceable in
whole or part. 6 ' A contract miner which has made a substantial investment
in equipment or development expenses and is faced with an early termination
may also argue that the contract granted a mining license which was
rendered irrevocable by the contract miner's expenditures or that the owner
is estopped from exercising its right to terminate by virtue of expenditures.
Although this argument may not be accepted in all jurisdictions, it may pro-
vide grounds for equitable relief in others."7
The contract mining agreement may provide that either party may ter-
minate the agreement in certain events. This occurs, for example, in the
event that the contract miner reasonably determines that mining operations
cannot be carried on in a profitable manner or that the owner is unable to
market the coal. In addition, the agreement may provide for early termina-
tion in the event of an extended force majeure.
H. Termination on Default
Absent a clause permitting termination on default, the default must be
material in order to excuse performance or entitle the injured party to cancel
the contract. '68 To avoid the uncertainty created by having to determine what
constitutes a material default, the owner may insist on a provision which
enumerates specific events of default entitling the owner to terminate the
contract. Typically, these will include failure of the contract miner to perform
or observe any covenant or condition of the agreement, any representation or
warranty which proves to be inaccurate when made, or the occurrence of any
one of a number of bankruptcy or insolvency related defaults. In negotiating
' See Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920(1974) (oil company's right to terminate dealer agreement on ten days' notice void against public
policy; but superseded by statute); Jordan, Unconscionability at the Gas Station, 62 MINN. L. REV.
813, 837-40 (1978; see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976) (ten day ter-
mination clause in gasoline dealership lease held unconscionable); but see Witmer v. Exxon Corp.,
260 Pa. Super. Ct. 537, 394 A.2d 1276 (1978), aff'd, 495 Pa. 540, 434 A.2d 1222 (1981) (action by oil
dealers in which doctrine of unconscionability held unavailable as a defense).
" Compare Tucker v. Carter Oil Co., 315 Ill. App. 264, 43 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1942); with Shuster
v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 395 Pa. 441, 454-58, 149 A.2d 447, 454 (1959). See generally 3
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 14.5, 14.6 (1982).
1C 6 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 812 (3d ed. 1972).
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these provisions, the contract miner should insist that the breach of a cove-
nant or representation be material and that the owner give notice of the
breach and provide an opportunity to cure. The notice and cure period will
naturally vary depending upon the nature of the default. For example, the
owner may be unwilling to acquiesce to a notice and cure provision where the
contract miner has failed to maintain an important permit. However, where
the default is the filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy, the owner
may be willing to allow sixty or ninety days for the petition to be dismissed
since, as a practical matter, dismissal before that time may not be possible.
Where the contract miner is engaged in other mining operations for the
owner on adjacent or even geographically distant parcels, the owner may in-
sist on a provision making a default under any of the other contracts a
default under the present contract. Such a cross-default clause may work to
the disadvantage of the contract miner if he has a significant number of rela-
tionships with the owner. In addition, the owner may insist on a cross-default
clause if he has made loans to the contract miner to purchase mining equip-
ment or has leased the equipment to the contract miner. The cross-default
clause in that situation would provide that a default under the lease or the
loan agreement will constitute a default under the contract mining agree-
ment and vice versa. As with other defaults, the contract miner should seek
notice and opportunity to cure prior to termination.
I. Force Majeure
Since a contract mining agreement is structured as a contract for ser-
vices and not a contract for the sale of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code,
including section 2-615 (relating to commercial impracticability), does not
apply except by analogy. Rather than relying upon the common law doctrine
of impossibility of performance, the contract miner should insist on the inclu-
sion of a force majeure clause to provide relief where performance is
prevented by a sudden, unforeseen occurrence which is outside of the control
of the parties."' The force majeure clause actually serves three functions: (1)
it excuses what would otherwise be an event of default and thus avoids the
consequences of default; (2) it terminates, suspends or modifies the obligation
of the parties to perform their other obligations under the agreement; and, (3)
it extends the time for performance and the term of the agreement for
periods of force majeure. Typically, the owner will insist on notice of an
event of force majeure and a provision allowing him to terminate the agree-
ment if the event of force majeure is not lifted after a certain period. The
... See generally Williams, Coping with Acts of Gods, Strikes and Other Delights-The Use
of Force Majeure Provisions in Mining Contracts, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 433 (1976); Young,
Construction and Enforcement of Long Term Coal Supply Agreements-Coping with Conditions
Arising from Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Events, Force Majeure and Gross Inequity Clauses,
27A ROCKY MTN. MTN. MIN. L. INST. 127 (1982).
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contract miner may wish to inplude in the force majeure provision a clause
requiring the owner to pay a proportionate share of the actual expense of
maintaining the mine during an event of force majeure or, in the event of an
early termination, to pay a cancellation charge as compensation to the con-
tract miner for all or a portion of the contract miner's unrecovered capital in-
vestment in the mine.
VII. BANKRUPTCY OF LESSOR OR LESSEE
A. Introduction
Section 365 of Title 11 of the United States Code17 governs the treatment
of coal leases and contract mining agreements upon the bankruptcy of any
party to those agreements. Section 365(a) allows the trustee, or the debtor in
possession in a Chapter 11 proceeding, to assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, subject to court approval.171
If the contract or lease is in default, the .trustee may not assume the con-
tract or lease unless it; (1) cures such default or provides adequate assurance
that it will cure such default; (2) compensates the other party for pecuniary
losses resulting from such default or gives adequate assurance that it will
promptly provide such compensation; and, (3) gives adequate assurance of
future performanceY.12 These requirements do not apply where the default
relates to the financial condition of the debtor or to bankruptcy or insol-
vency. 7 3
In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the contract or lease is deemed rejected if it is
not assumed or rejected within sixty days after the filing of the petition.74 If
the contract is assumed, the trustee may assign the contract or lease without
the consent of any of the other parties if it provides adequate assurance of
future performance by the assignee. 75 This right is unimpaired by a clause in
the contract or lease which prohibits assignment.' After assignment, the
trustee is relieved of any liability with respect to the contract or lease.
77
B. Bankruptcy of Lessor
If the lessor files a petition in bankruptcy and the trustee elects to reject
the unexpired lease, section 365(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code 78 gives the
170 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
.. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
.' 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1982).
173 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) (1982).
' 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1982).
17 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (1982).
,,8 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(3) (1982).
" 11 U.S.C. § 365(k) (1982).
17 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1982).
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lessee the right to treat the lease as terminated by such rejection or to re-
main in possession of the property for the balance of the term of the lease
plus any renewals or extensions that are legally enforceable by the lessee."'
In this situation, the contract miner's rights will be protected only if the
lessee elects to remain in possession of the property despite the owner's re-
jection of the lease.
To protect the contract miner from the potential loss of his rights under
these circumstances, the drafter of the contract mining agreement should in-
clude provisions in the agreement which would require the lessee to elect to
remain in possession for the term of the lease (and all enforceable extensions
and renewals thereof) should the owner of the property declare bankruptcy
and reject the lease.
C. Bankruptcy of Lessee
If the lessee declares bankruptcy, the lessee may accept the lease and re-
ject the contract mining agreement. If such is the case, the lessee will be able
to retain the leasehold interest in the coal and avoid any contractual arrange-
ment with the contract miner.
The contract miner can protect against the risk of the lessee rejecting
both the lease and the contract mining agreement, by entering into a
separate agreement with the lessor in which the lessor gives the contract
miner the right to cure any default under the lessee's lease and requires the
lessor to give notice to the contract miner of any default by the lessee under
the lease. If the lessee declares bankruptcy and rejects the lease, the agree-
ment should provide the contract miner with the right to obtain a new lease
from the lessor. Thus, in the event of a bankruptcy by the lessee, the contract
miner will have the right to mine the property should the lessee default or
declare bankruptcy and reject the lease.
D. Preferences
A preference is a transfer of the property of the debtor, made within the
ninety-day period before the filing of a bankruptcy petition, to or for the
benefit of a creditor, on account of an antecedent debt, which enables the
creditor to receive more than it otherwise would receive on its claim in a
Chapter 7 liquidation.180
There are, however, several exceptions to the preference provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. One exception is a payment in the ordinary course of
... In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re 1438 Meridian
Place, N.W., Inc., 11 Bankr. 353 (Bankr. D.C. 1981); and In re LHD Realty Corp. v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 20 Bankr. 717 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982).
11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
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business not later than forty-five days after the debt was incurred.'8' Thus, if
an owner makes a payment to the contract miner within ninety days before
the owner files a petition in bankruptcy, but more than forty-five days after
the payment was due, and if this allows the contract miner to receive more
than he would otherwise have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation, the trustee
may be able to void the payment as a preference.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although many contract mining agreements fall into an established pat-
tern, there are many opportunities to tailor the agreement to fit the peculiar
characteristics of a given situtation. As has been shown, once the parties
have generally decided upon the division of engineering, mining and
marketing responsibilities and the price per ton, there are a myriad of prac-
tical and legal problems in negotiating and drafting an agreement which
meets the objectives of both parties. With a basic understanding of the cur-
rent law in the areas of property, contracts, federal and state taxation, tort
liability, health and safety, environmental compliance and bankruptcy, the
parties can address the significant issues which may arise during the term of
the contract.
'a' 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982).
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